Does The US Want To Divide-And-Rule Belarus & Russia Or De-Escalate Continental Tensions? - Andrew Korybko

Kellogg’s six-hour-long meeting with Lukashenko raises questions about the US’ intentions.

Andrew Korybko Jun 23, 2025 CET

Trump’s Special Envoy on Ukraine Keith Kellogg just met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Minsk for six hours of detailed talks. The latter’s press secretary revealed that they discussed “U.S. and EU sanctions against Belarus, the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and Belarus’ relations with Russia and China.” This comes amidst the Russian-Ukrainian talks entering an impasse that only the US or brute force can break as explained here and was then followed by Belarus releasing 14 prisoners.

These included Belarusians “convicted of terrorist and extremist activities”, according to Lukashenko’s press secretary, but they were pardoned “solely for humanitarian reasons”. In reality, however, this was almost certainly a goodwill gesture from Lukashenko to Trump like Kellogg’s deputy John Coale strongly suggested in the video that he posted on X afterwards. The regional military-strategic context within which this happened sheds light on why Lukashenko complied with Trump’s alleged request.

Ukraine has been saber-rattling along the Belarusian border since last summer, tensions with Poland have also escalated, Warsaw rejected Minsk’s proposal for mutual military inspections, Zelensky began fearmongering about fall’s Zapad 2025 drills with Russia, and Belarus is worried about being left out of the Ukrainian peace process. These factors combined to create an opening for American-Belarusian talks since the US is Ukraine and Poland’s shared senior partner and plays a major role in the ongoing conflict.

Belarus therefore expects the US to clarify what Ukraine and Poland aim to achieve through their (coordinated?) pressure along its borders and restrain them if they have aggressive intentions, while the US expects that Belarus won’t allow itself to be used as a “launching pad for more Russian aggression”. Belarus’ mutual defense deal with Russia and hosting of its tactical nukes, along with the right to use the them as Lukashenko sees fit, gives it outsized importance in the evolving European security architecture.

The NATO-Russian security dilemma can either be worsened if Belarus is attacked by the US’ junior partners or in the political fantasy that it lets Russia invade the Suwalki Corridor, or it can be alleviated if there’s a de-escalation of border tensions (possibly in exchange for a drawdown of Russian assets there, perhaps even including its tactical nukes). The US would prefer for the aforesaid drawdown to be obtained unilaterally while Russia would only hypothetically be interested in it as part of a larger deal.

Accordingly, the US might seek to provoke a rift between Russia and Belarus by convincing Lukashenko that his country’s best interests are served by requesting the envisaged drawdown, which could precede the partial lifting of Western sanctions and a possible rapprochement. He’s Putin’s closest foreign partner and their countries are even working together to build a Union State, however, so Lukashenko might not allow himself to be manipulated by the same forces that also tried to overthrow him half a decade ago.

It’s much more likely that he agreed with Putin ahead of time that any serious discussion about possibly drawing down Russian assets in Belarus (especially its tactical nukes) is contingent on tangible progress first being made on de-escalating tensions along its borders with Poland and Ukraine. In the scenario that the US agrees to a quid pro quo, then Belarus might become the key to alleviating the NATO-Russian security dilemma after the Ukrainian Conflict finally ends, but it’s too early to predict either way.