It’s Premature To Jump To Conclusions About The Pentagon’s Review Of AUKUS - Andrew Korybko

The US is unlikely to exit AUKUS, even as a goodwill gesture to China in the context of Trump’s self-declared “total reset” in their ties, but it could curtail the number of nuclear-powered attack submarines that it gives Australia if it determines that the original pledge can’t be comfortably met.

Andrew Korybko Jun 19, 2025 CET

The Pentagon’s announcement that it’ll review AUKUS over the next 30 days to ensure that “this initiative of the previous administration is aligned with the President's America First agenda” sparked speculation that the US might leave Australia and the UK in the lurch by pulling out of this pact. Its primary pillar will see the US sell Australia three second-hand nuclear-powered attack submarines with the option to buy two more, AUKUS’ real importance goes beyond this large-scale arms sale.

AUKUS can be conceptualized as an “Asian NATO” that can expand, whether formally or informally via the AUKUS+ framework, to include other countries like Japan and the Philippines which share an interest in containing China. It therefore essentially replaces the Quad’s previously US-envisaged role as an anti-Chinese regional military integration platform. The most tangible manifestation of this alliance in action is the so-called “Squad” that was recently formed between the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines.

Accordingly, the US’ hypothetical exit from AUKUS after the end of the Pentagon’s ongoing 30-day review could shatter these grand strategic plans, potentially alleviating the worsening security dilemma between China and the US in the Western Pacific in parallel with their newly announced trade deal. It’s premature to jump to that conclusion, however, since Defense News published an insightful article explaining the nuances behind this review as perceived by its initiator Elbridge Colby.

He's the new Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and was quoted in their article as having previously expressed concern about the US’ shipbuilding capabilities: If we can produce the attack submarines in sufficient number and sufficient speed, then great. But if we can’t, that becomes a very difficult problem because we don’t want our servicemen and women to be in a weaker position. It should be the policy of the United States government to do everything we can to make this work.”

This suggests that he’s less interested in exiting AUKUS than he is in potentially curtailing the scope of its primary pillar, the sale of US nuclear-powered attack submarines to Australia, which could drop from 3-5 if the Pentagon determines that the US can’t comfortably meet its original pledge. Colby can be described as a “China hawk”, albeit more rational than his establishment peers, so it’s difficult imagining him being interested in doing away with AUKUS’ role as a regional military integration platform.

Nevertheless, whatever pragmatic changes might potentially follow the Pentagon’s review could be presented as a partially inspired by goodwill in the context of Trump’s self-declared “total reset” in ties with China, provided of course that their new trade deal is ultimately signed. In that scenario, the US would continue pressuring China via AUKUS, though tensions could de-escalate a bit due to this initiative’s reduced nuclear submarine scope even if the regional military integration role remains intact.

Therein lies the main point, namely that the aforesaid role is too important to the US’ grand strategic plans to be abandoned under any circumstances, even in the very far-fetched scenario that it takes on different branding if the US exits AUKUS. Regardless of however much their ties might soon normalize or even improve, it’s in the US’ enduring interests as policymakers on both sides of the aisle see it (whether rightly or wrongly) to maintain military pressure on China, and this likely won’t ever change.