The formation of such a grouping appears to be a logical step, considering the long-observed shift in global political and economic processes towards the Indo-Pacific region (IPR). The “Core Five” could become an effective platform for discussing and resolving emerging problems in the region, which are often serious and potentially perilous. An exchange of views among representatives of the region’s leading countries would be extremely important, as the dynamics of developments in the IPR are largely determined by the state of their relations.
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis, it is worth making several preliminary remarks regarding the idea per se.
List of Participants
The proposed composition of participants appears quite representative. It unites five powers that significantly outpace other countries in the region in terms of “Comprehensive National Power,” primarily in terms of national GDP volume.
A state, like a person, is subject to countless threats, and it is impossible to get protected from them simultaneously and with a universal means
In this regard, statements questioning the advisability of including Japan in the group are puzzling. Japan’s nominal GDP is more than 60% larger than Russia’s. Furthermore, Japan is the informal leader of the regional trade bloc, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), whose 12 members’ GDP put all together constitutes about 16% of the global GDP. Importantly, from 2025, the United Kingdom will become a fully-fledged member of the CPTPP, which will come as a result of years of effort and support from Japan. Other countries are also seeking to join the association.
As for the “Core Five,” firstly, its composition could be expanded, similar to other international platforms such as the SCO and BRICS. The goal of such a format is not a “re-division of the world,” as some propagandists mistakenly believe, but rather addressing complex and dangerous regional problems.
Therefore, other important IPR countries could and should be involved in the works of the “Core Five,” for example, Australia, Indonesia, and Pakistan, as well as both Koreas. The processes taking place in the IPR have already seen active involvement of extra-regional powers. Among them, there is Brazil, as well as a number of influential European countries, particularly the United Kingdom and France, which possess territories in the Pacific. Germany has long been deeply integrated into China’s economy. Italy is also asserting its presence in the IPR. However, it is obvious that the Brussels bureaucracy of the EU, which is still represented on the Russian territory for reasons unknown, has absolutely nothing to do with the works of the “Core Five.” As a movie character aptly noted, their “place” has long been determined.
Challenges of the “Core Five” Project: An Outlook on the Difficulties
The creation of the “Core Five” faces a number of serious challenges, the first and most obvious of which is related to the complex relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. These two global powers, being primary competitors, will nevertheless have to cooperate within the future configuration.
It is important to note the emergence of new, objective trends in US positioning on the world stage. These trends, indicated in the new National Security Strategy (NSS-2025), are not the result of the current administration’s momentary decisions. They reflect deeper shifts in the American foreign policy.
The essence of the new NSS can be reduced to three key points:
Prioritization of domestic issues: the US is focusing on solving its own tasks.
Return to the Monroe Doctrine: the foreign policy focuses on the regional interests, relying on the historical doctrine.
“Peace through strength” in relations with the PRC: in the geopolitical confrontation with China, the US seeks to achieve peace through a demonstration of strength, paying specific attention to reinforcing existing formats and forming new regional alliances.
It is exactly the last thesis, which points at other challenges that could complicate not only the productive work of the future configuration but also the very possibility of its formation. These difficulties have been discussed on a regular basis for a long time, arising long before the NSS-2025 was made public. We are talking about the difficult relations of the PRC with two other potential participants of the “Core Five” — India and Japan.
With India, the US maintains a (quasi-)alliance that functions in various forms, including the Quad configuration, despite current complications. In terms of Japan, there is a fully-fledged military-political alliance, which is the cornerstone of bilateral relations, as consistently emphasized by the leaders of both countries. Japan finds the alliance particularly crucial due to its deteriorating relations with the PRC.
The growing role of Japan-India rapprochement for the situation in the Indo-Pacific region should also be taken into account. This process, like the Quad configuration (whose significance is underlined in NSS-2025), is an important factor influencing regional security dynamics and the potential for forming the “Core Five.”
Russia in the Future World Configuration: Rethinking the Concept of “Security”
It is important to understand: any future configuration of the world’s leading countries, if it comes into being at all, will not be created on the basis of illusory notions of a “Yalta-2.” Russia could perhaps use its advanced weaponry – “Sarmat,” “Poseidon,” hypersonic weapons – as its main argument in ensuring its own security. However, this thesis, in the author’s opinion, raises serious doubts, especially considering the tragic experience of the USSR.
The predecessor of the Russian Federation, the Soviet Union, unexpectedly ceased its existence despite possessing a formidable “nuclear missile shield,” created through colossal efforts of the entire nation. This shield, designed to guarantee security, continued to “gleam with steel.” However, the collapse of the USSR served as yet another confirmation of a long-standing verity: there is no absolute “security,” either in nature or in politics. A state, like a person, is subject to countless threats, and it is impossible to get protected from them simultaneously and with a universal means.
The term “security” can be used for applied purposes, but it is necessary to realise that it refers to an extremely complex, comprehensive, and, most importantly, probabilistic process. If we reduce it exclusively to its “weaponry” component, history knows many examples when, at the peak of expensive programs to create “wonder weapons,” it turned out that the expectations associated with them were unjustifiably inflated. This was the case with dreadnought battleships in the first half of the previous century. The prophetic outlook of Japanese experts on the counterproductiveness of building super-dreadnoughts of the “Yamato” class proved to be correct.
In conclusion, modern Russia should position itself as a participant capable of adequately assessing the emerging situation and its own capabilities to influence it.
As for leadership ambitions, it is worth recalling the positive experience of the USSR, which led the “Peace Movement.” This did not mean allowing paranoids to preach the “inevitability of war” with impunity, but nor did it deprive them of the right to create, at their own expense, platforms for public communication where they could “express themselves” within the framework of the law.
Russia’s desired image in the still hypothetical “Core Five” should be aimed not at “redistributing spheres of influence” but at solving national and regional problems.
Vladimir Terekhov, Expert on Asia-Pacific Issues
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By Independent News Roundup