By Independent News Roundup
Zelensky’s West Asian tour, which saw him clinch security deals with the Gulf Kingdoms that are worth paying attention to for the reasons that were explained here, culminated in a surprise visit to Syria. After meeting with his counterpart Ahmed Sharaa, he announced that “There is strong interest in exchanging military and security experience.” It’s unclear what form this could take, such as if Ukraine will provide drone warfare training to Syria (perhaps for free to spite Russia?), but Sharaa’s calculations are obvious.
“Russia’s Interests In Syria Go Far Beyond Retaining Its Air & Naval Bases” as was explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis after Sharaa’s latest meeting with Putin at the Kremlin in February. These are mutually beneficial business opportunities and “nation-building”, the second of which relates to the “New Syria” that Sharaa envisages, and Russia hopes that the demonstration effect of succeeding with this in Syria will lead to other countries requesting its support. African ones are its most likely prospects.
Ukraine has no military bases in Syria, their business ties are mostly Ukrainian agricultural exports to Syria, and it has no experience in helping others “nation-build”. Nevertheless, by exploring closer security cooperation with Ukraine, Syria wants to make Russia jealous so that it offers better terms on their deals in furtherance of its aforesaid interests if it fears that Syria might fall too far under Ukraine’s influence and consider closing Russia’s bases. More drone cooperation could exacerbate these fears.
Not only might this reduce the appeal of Russia as one of Syria’s top security partners with time, which it relies upon to preemptively avert disproportionate dependence on Turkiye (but this role could hypothetically be replaced by more Turkish-friendly Ukraine), but it also poses a latent threat. The post-Assad Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is now comprised of many “former” terrorist-designated individuals who could put their Ukrainian drone training to use in attacking their erstwhile enemy’s bases in Syria.
It’s also possible that Sharaa could weaponize this by feigning “plausible deniability” if he decides to turn a blind eye to such preparations in the event of future disputes with Russia over business terms or whatever else. To be sure, Russia and Syria benefit from maintaining their Assad-era strategic ties, but more Ukrainian influence over Syria could distort the perceptions of Sharaa and his team. Therefore, it can’t be ruled out that this won’t end in another setback for Russia, which Russia might thus try to avoid.
In pursuit of that, expanding cooperation with Syria on the earlier-mentioned issues and offering better terms too could be the means that Russia employs, quite wisely too since Ukraine’s interest in the Arab Republic strongly suggests an intent to spoil its adversary’s ties with it. In fact, this should be a priority so that Russia maintains the strategic initiative vis-à-vis Ukraine and doesn’t cede it by procrastinating due to the false belief that Zelensky’s visit poses no threat, which would be an epic miscalculation.
The precedent established by Ukraine’s drone warfare training to Mali’s terrorist-designated Tuareg rebels, which led to them devastatingly ambushing Wagner in summer 2024, hints at the fate that could befall Russian troops in Syria if ties deteriorate over whatever issue it may be. This dark scenario could be averted if Russia replaces Ukraine’s likely drone warfare training role in the SAA, limits it to vetted non-radical members, and offers better partnership terms to win the new competition for Syria’s loyalty.
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