By Independent News Roundup
Andrew Korybko Aug 04, 2025 CET
The Foreign Ministers of Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine met in the eastern Polish city of Lublin in late July to mark the fifth anniversary of their “Lublin Triangle”. Its name refers to the 1569 Union of Lublin that created the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which built upon the 1385 Union of Krewo. Most of what’s now known as Ukraine was part of that Polish-led-civilization. The Lublin Triangle is a security-centric platform whose founding preceded the 2020 Belarusian elections by less than two weeks.
This context suggests that it was meant to facilitate their joint efforts to overthrow Lukashenko through the preplanned Color Revolution that followed, after which the new Belarusian government would be admitted to the Lublin Triangle, thus turning it into the core of a “Neo-Commonwealth”. That regime change operation failed, however, and this in turn foiled the preceding geopolitical plan. The Lublin Triangle was then forgotten about by most observers after the special operation began 18 months later.
There are several reasons why it’s back in the news apart from this half-decade-long anniversary. The first concerns their plans to strengthen defense industry cooperation right after Trump’s new three-pronged approach to the Ukrainian Conflict shifted the burden for arming Ukraine onto the Europeans (both directly and via the transfer of purchased US arms); the second is the “Historians’ Forum” that they unveiled; and the third is their plans for a presidential meeting in Kiev.
In the order that they were mentioned, Russia’s recent bombing of a Polish factory in Ukraine drew attention to Polish-Ukrainian defense cooperation. Warsaw claimed that it was a wooden flooring plant, but Moscow claims that it only strikes defense-related targets, so it’s possible that this was also one operating under civilian cover. As Polish-Ukrainian defense cooperation and the special operation continue, more such incidents are expected, which could be exploited to justify Western escalation.
As for the Historians’ Forum, this is meant to counteract divisive narratives allegedly pushed by Russia, but some Polish and Ukrainian interpretations of historical memory are irreconcilable. These include Ukrainians’ treatment during the Commonwealth era, Khmelnitsky’s Uprising, the “Koliszczyzna”, Ukrainians’ treatment in the Second Polish Republic, the Volhynia Genocide, and “Operation Vistula”. Poland’s incoming president, who led the Institute of Historical Memory, is unlikely to make concessions.
The aforesaid point segues into the planned presidential meeting in Kiev. Karol Nawrocki made Ukraine’s recognition of the Volhynia Genocide, along with it properly exhuming and then burying the over 100,000 victims (mostly women and children), a key part of his campaign. He also pledged not to support its membership in NATO or send troops there. Nawrocki doesn’t plan to cut off Polish support for Ukraine, but these policies might make it politically difficult for him to visit Kiev anytime soon.
As can be seen, the Lublin Triangle still exists, but it’ll never fulfill its initial aim of creating a Neo-Commonwealth. The failure to overthrow Lukashenko coupled with all that happened since the special operation began led to the narrowing of its scope into a socio-cultural and security club. Ukraine is also much more ultra-nationalist than before and thus loath to become Poland’s junior partner. The Lublin Triangle will therefore continue to lurch along, but the opportunity to play an important role has passed.
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