The Odessa Moment - Scott Ritter (Opinion)

Scott Ritter May 17, 2025

Russia has informed Ukraine of its baseline condition for conflict termination—the withdrawal of all Ukrainian troops from the territory of lands which, from the perspective of the Russian Constitution, constitute part of Mother Russia. These include Kherson, Zaporozhia, Donetsk and Lugansk. Russia has also made it clear that if Ukraine does not accept these terms, the next time Russia is willing to sit down and negotiate with Ukraine their demands will include four additional Ukrainian oblasts, or administrative regions—presumably Odessa, Nikolaev, Dnepropetrovsk, and Kharkov. We have reached the Odessa Moment.

Back in January 2023, while appearing on “The Gaggle” with George Szamuely and Peter Lavelle, I postulated that Russia was approaching what I called “the Odessa Moment,” that confluence of military and political circumstances which, once reached, would trigger a strategic decision by Russia to expand the Special Military Operation (SMO) beyond the geography defined by the territories absorbed by Russia following a controversial referenda held in September 2022 on the territory of Kherson, Zaporozhia, Donetsk and Lugansk, in which the question of self-determination was answered by a vote on whether these territories should be incorporated into the Russian Federation or not.

As originally conceived, the SMO was not about territorial acquisition but rather defending the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Ukraine. In negotiations which began less than a week after the SMO began—first in Gomel, Belarus, and later in Turkey—Russia simply sought to achieve that which had been promised as part of the Minsk Accords entered into with Ukraine, Germany and France in 2014-2015, in which Ukraine promised to make the appropriate changes to its Constitution guaranteeing that the rights and status of Russian-speaking Ukrainians would be protected.

Ukraine, backed by both Germany and France (and the United States as well) opted to treat the Minsk Accords as an opportunity to build up military power sufficient to reclaim parts of the Donbas region (comprised of the oblasts of Donetsk and Lugansk) as well as Crimea which were lost in the aftermath of the CIA-backed Maidan coup of February 2014 which saw the Russian-speaking lawfully elected President, Victor Yanukovych, ousted and replaced by US-backed Ukrainian nationalists. Between 2015 and 2022, the US and its NATO allies trained and equipped hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers for the sole purpose of reclaiming by force the territories of Donetsk, Lugansk and Crimea.

In April 2019 Volodymyr Zelensky, the former comedian-turned politician, won the election for the office of President of Ukraine, ousting the incumbent, Petro Poroshenko. Zelensky ran on a platform of peace, winning over the Russian-speaking population on the promise that he would “crawl on his knees” if necessary to work out a peace plan with Russia. Instead, within months Zelensky was convening a war council where he promised to use the Ukrainian military to reclaim the parts of Donetsk and Lugansk that had freed themselves from Ukrainian rule.

This was Zelensky’s first mistake.

The path he chose led to Russia, in the days before the initiation of the SMO and after Ukraine began mobilizing its forces to attack the Donbas, recognizing the independence of both Donetsk and Lugansk and entering into a collective security agreement, actions which guaranteed that the Donbas would never again be part of Ukraine.

This was Zelensky’s Donbas moment.

Zelensky’s second mistake came in April 2022, when he walked away from the negotiations that Russia had initiated immediately after the start of the SMO which culminated in a finalized signature-ready peace agreement which has become known as the Istanbul communique. This agreement would have recognized the independence of the Donbas republics, but returned all other Ukrainian territory that had been occupied by Russian troops during the SMO.

Zelensky, pressured by his US and NATO supporters, rejected this agreement, and instead took tens of billions of dollars in military aid from the US and NATO which he used to rebuild his depleted military force, which he then used to launch a counterattack against Russian forces which had already began their withdrawal from Ukraine as a good faith measure in keeping with the terms of the Istanbul communique.

Russia responded by organizing referenda in both the Donbas and the two oblasts, Kherson and Zaporozhia, that constituted the land bridge connecting Crimea with Russia proper. These referenda were on the question of these territories becoming part of the Russian Federation; all four voted yes, and after the appropriate legal action was taken by the Russian parliament, President Putin signed a decree which made all four oblasts part of the Russian Federation.

This was Zelensky’s Little Russia moment.

And now Zelensky finds himself at a new crossroads.

His Odessa Moment.

He has a chance to end the SMO on the most favorable terms possible, terms which reflect the harsh reality the Ukrainian President and the nation he leads faces due to Zelensky’s prior poor decision-making regarding Russia.

The Donbas is gone. So, too, is Little Russia. These losses are irreversible, politically and militarily.

Ukraine has a chance to end the conflict now. But to do so it must respect the reality of the moment.

Unfortunately, the same “friends” and “allies” which encouraged Ukraine to walk away from the Minsk Accords and the Istanbul communique are now urging Ukraine to do the same when it comes to Istanbul 2.

But the promise of European support is illusory—the armories have long since been stripped bare, and the potential for meaningful military intervention never existed, either militarily or politically.

Moreover, any European action would, by necessity, require backing from the United States. While this may have been a possibility during the presidency of Joe Biden, it is a non-starter under the new administration of Donald Trump—even as the Istanbul 2 meetings were underway, the US announced that it was going to be withdrawing its forces from Europe.

Russia is to be taken seriously. While the challenges that Russia will face in occupying the four new territories it has put its sights on if Ukraine balks yet again regarding a peace agreement are many and not to be minimized, this is a military question which is best answered by the political resolve of the Russian leadership and nation, which at this juncture is unassailable.

Last year Vladimir Putin won a mandate to governing as a wartime President.

As the recently concluded May 9 celebration clearly demonstrated, the determination of the Russian people to defeat Ukraine is rock solid.

As the lead Russian negotiator in Istanbul made clear to his Ukrainian counterparts, Russia is prepared to fight for however long it takes, even alluding to the 21 years it took Peter the Great to defeat Sweden.

Ukraine will be lucky to survive the summer.

Zelensky faces one of the greatest tests of leadership he will ever face.

Nationalist forces in his government are willing to commit national suicide in pursuit of the failed Banderist cause.

Ukraine’s erstwhile allies, whose objectives continue to center around Cold War fantasies of strategically defeating Russia, are pushing Zelensky to reject the Russian conditions for peace, all too willing to sacrifice Ukraine as a proxy in pursuit of their unattainable goal.

If Zelensky truly cared about his nation and his people, he would swallow his pride and make the only decision capable of saving them—surrender.

But Zelensky is not a leader who cares about his nation or its people—he has already sacrificed Ukraine’s national integrity and more than a million of its citizens in pursuit of his EU and NATO driven fantasies of relevance and fortune.

This is Zelensky’s Odessa Moment.

And he will fail.

Again.