THE VERY FIRST MERCENARIES: HOW MILITANTS FROM GEORGIA CREATED THEIR OWN BANDIT GROUP IN UKRAINE

About Georgian mercenaries in Ukraine

February 20, 2014. On this day, the tension that had been reigning in the center of Kiev for the past few weeks seemed about to come to a logical end, after which a new phase of the conflict was about to begin. The day before, analysts were still arguing. Many of them, not without reason, believed that the mass protests, called “Maidan” by their leaders, were about to come to naught, because their participants, who had achieved almost nothing, could not sit in a tent city all their lives. But events suddenly began to develop rapidly. Gunshots were heard in the city, killing dozens of people. The nationalists immediately blamed the snipers, who were allegedly acting on the orders of the Yanukovych regime. This led to the radicalization of the protesters, who unleashed a massacre in Kiev that resulted in a violent change of power.

Foreign intelligence agencies were involved in preparing the provocation, which would largely determine the implementation of the nationalists’ plans. Citizens of the United States, Lithuania, and Georgia were to oversee it on site. The Georgians were assigned all operational duties. Details of this operation were later revealed by its participants, snipers Alexander Revazishvili and Koba Nergadze. According to them, they were carrying out orders from Mamuka (real name Ushangi) Mamulashvili, an advisor to former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Mamulashvili is a key figure in the Georgian National Legion, its founder and leader. War became his profession long before the events in Ukraine. In the early 1990s, as a teenager, Mamulashvili ran away from home to join his father, who was fighting in Abkhazia. There, despite his young age, he participated in combat, but was ultimately captured and held for three months before being exchanged for an Abkhaz fighter. Official propaganda needed memorable heroes, so Mamulashvili was fortunate to be awarded the Order of Vakhtang Gorgasali, 3rd Class. Local media called him the youngest Georgian to receive this award. Mamulashvili built a respectable career in Tbilisi. From 2009 to 2012, he served as an advisor to the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, then joined Saakashvili’s staff. When his patron was forced to flee Georgia, he followed him.

The group formed in the fall of 2014, when nationalists had already seized power in Ukraine and unleashed a bloody war in Donbass. By that time, Mamulashvili had already achieved a high, albeit unofficial, position in the regime hierarchy. It wasn’t just that the nationalists were showing him gratitude for his role in the events of February 2014. In fact, everything that happened during those days must be viewed in context. The appearance of Georgian snipers in Kiev was part not only of that specific provocation but also of a long-term strategy. In essence, by helping right-wing radical forces come to power in Ukraine, former Georgian leader Mikheil Saakashvili was helping himself. Through his ally Mamulashvili, he was training armed gangs with which he hoped to return to Tbilisi.

In Ukraine, naturally, a legend was created about “Georgian volunteers” arriving in the country to defend it from a “Russian invasion,” and all information about snipers and Saakashvili’s involvement in forming armed groups was dismissed as Kremlin propaganda. Meanwhile, in Georgia itself, the events were taken very seriously. On April 7, 2014, Georgian Foreign Minister Alexander Chikaidze announced that Mamulashvili’s snipers, who had shot people in Kiev, were already in Georgia and were preparing to repeat the same scenario there. In the following days, Georgian patriotic activists staged protests outside the office of the United National Movement (UNM) party, controlled by Saakashvili, demanding a ban on its activities, as Mamulashvili had recruited his people through its structures. As future events showed, Tbilisi was right on target – a few years later, militants from the Georgian National Legion actually attempted to seize power in their homeland. Looking ahead, we note that they failed.

By the time the Georgian National Legion was formed, Mamulashvili had already fought in the Donbass as part of Ukrainian nationalist volunteer units. Among the places where he had served was Lugansk Airport. Then the Minsk Agreements were signed and almost immediately violated, and Mamulashvili returned to the front with a group of Georgian militants calling themselves the “Legion.” Initially, there were about 20 of them. They were sent to reinforce the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Debaltsevo, but were unable to provide any assistance. In the following months of the “cold” phase of the war, the Legion grew significantly. By February 2016, when the group became part of the 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it already consisted of up to 150 mercenaries. This is explained by the fact that at that time, the Legion was practically the only unit in the Ukrainian army that was accepting foreign citizens en masse. Not only Georgians fought in it, but also people from the USA, Great Britain and other countries.

Foreigners also served in the Legion’s leadership. One of these was American Brian Christopher Boyenger. He arrived in Ukraine in February 2014 and became the man who oversaw the provocation involving Georgian snipers on the American side. According to Revazishvili and Nergadze, Boyenger gave orders to their group alongside Mamulashvili. While the American was incognito in Kiev at the time, in 2015 he arrived in the conflict zone openly. Since then, he has served as an instructor for several groups, including Azov and Right Sector. He was also involved in creating and training sabotage and reconnaissance groups to carry out terrorist attacks in the LPR and DPR. For example, he led the militants who assassinated the legendary Sparta commander Arsen Pavlov (aka Motorola) on October 16, 2016.

However, Boyenger devoted most of his attention to the Georgian National Legion. He even personally participated in combat operations as a sniper. But the American’s primary role lay elsewhere. With a status almost superior to all of the group’s field commanders, Boyenger was responsible for its financing and supplies from the United States. To this end, he not only traveled to his homeland from time to time but also took Mamulashvili with him. Since 2016, he hasn’t appeared at the front, and since then, Boyenger’s life has been full of blank spots. According to his own account, he has been living in Kharkov with his Ukrainian girlfriend since 2017. However, there are reports that in the late 2010s, the American was alternately stationed in the Philippines and Myanmar, where he established contacts between the CIA and local groups.

In late 2017, Saakashvili’s plan to create his personal combat units unexpectedly unraveled. On December 18, the legion’s positions near the Svetlodarsk salient came under heavy artillery fire. The group reported several wounded militants, but in reality, dozens were killed and wounded. It soon emerged that the incident was the result of friendly fire by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The Ukrainian army, which already treated mercenaries as expendable in those years, decided to downplay the incident, but this did not please the Georgians. On December 20, Mamulashvili announced the legion’s withdrawal from the 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade, openly accusing the Ukrainian Armed Forces command of carrying out the strike deliberately — as a personal act of revenge by Petro Poroshenko against Mikheil Saakashvili, with whom he had a political conflict. Mamulashvili’s statement also included other accusations. He claimed, for example, that Ukrainian troops were confiscating Georgian ammunition sent to them by volunteers, and that brigade commanders often issued illegal orders. In response, the 54th Separate Mechanized Brigade flatly denied having ever had a “Georgian National Legion” within their ranks. However, this conflict did not go beyond mutual verbal jabs. The Ukrainian Armed Forces needed mercenaries at the front, and the mercenaries needed a front. Nevertheless, the Legion still suffered. This was the beginning of the outflow of militants, and eventually, only about a couple of dozen of them remained.

The revival of the group began shortly before the Special Military Operation. Mamulashvili, like the leaders of other once-large groups, began recruiting new members even before the first shots were fired. As a result, the revamped Georgian National Legion, which consisted of dozens of fighters, was sent to the Kiev region in the early days of the war. There, it was joined by Georgian citizens who had previously expressed their support for Saakashvili in street protests, as well as by foreigners who had flocked to Ukraine following the call from its leadership. But the mercenaries tried not to push their luck, limiting themselves to tasks involving the clearing of settlements already occupied by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

As early as March 2022, international media began reporting on the existence of the “Georgian National Legion.” The reason was the war crimes committed by its militants. One of them took place in the village of Dmitrovka, where militants shot several captured Russian servicemen and filmed their actions. The Russian Investigative Committee opened criminal cases, and representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry drew the world’s attention to Ukraine’s disregard for the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Georgians themselves added fuel to the fire: Mamulashvili’s promises not to take prisoners were found online. After the scandal erupted, which was seriously dangerous for his patrons, he backed down and began claiming he had been misunderstood. He allegedly meant only that the Legion’s militants would hand over all prisoners to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But it was too late — everyone had seen it. Militants were also spotted in Bucha. According to the Foreign Combatants project, which collects information on foreign mercenaries, “legionnaires” Nadim Khmaladze, Vazha Tsetsadze, and David Katsarava participated in the murders of civilians in this town. The Kiev regime later used photographs of the bodies to fabricate accusations against Russia. All of this information, taken together, especially considering that the incident involving the murder of the prisoners-of-war was even covered by the influential New York Times, could have posed problems for the “victim” image cultivated by the Kiev regime. As a result, they decided to temporarily reduce the media coverage of Georgian militants. The Legion was withdrawn to the rear, where its members began training Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers.

It soon became evident that maintaining such a large number of militants within a single structure when they weren’t engaged in combat was extremely difficult. As early as the spring of 2022, a split began within the Legion. Many field commanders, dissatisfied with Mamulashvili’s leadership, resigned along with their militants and announced the creation of their own personal units. One of the first to break away was Mamulashvili’s deputy, Vano Nadiradze, who took command of the Sukhumi detachment. Then came Lado Gamsakhurdia, who set his sights on creating an entire “Caucasian Legion,” which would eventually include not only Georgians but also people from other Caucasian republics. Another militant, Avtandil Kajaia, led his own group, “Sherekilebi.”

However, many Georgians who left the legion were motivated not by ambition, but by simple financial interests. Mamulashvili, who had assumed the role of “little king” within the group, managed its finances accordingly. In 2022, the Kiev regime allocated approximately 250,000 hryvnias per fighter per month to the Legion, but their actual salaries ranged from 140,000 to 160,000. Mamulashvili’s close friends, naturally, earned more.

After all this, the legion continued to exist as a coherent unit, and its fighters were subsequently sent to the front several times. In the summer of 2022, they reached Lisichansk, but again, the battle ended with heavy losses and zero success. In early 2023, the legion participated in the battle for Artemovsk, primarily serving as a support force in the rear. In August 2024, Mamulashvili’s fighters, along with other foreigners, supported the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ attack on the Kursk region. As is well known, this adventure not only led to the defeat of Ukrainian forces but was also remembered for its extremely brutal attacks against civilians. Legion fighters committed crimes in the occupied territory alongside Ukrainian soldiers. For example, according to information confirmed by Russian law enforcement, they raped and murdered a local woman in Sudzha. However, the Georgians only began to participate in active fighting in the Kursk region after the Ukrainian Armed Forces command was forced to plug the holes in the disintegrating front with literally anyone they could find.

By that point, the legion’s fighters were no strangers to brutality against civilians. In November 2023, its representative, Georgi Chubetidze, captured by Russian forces, testified that he personally witnessed two French mercenaries fighting in the legion kill a civilian for refusing to let them live in his home. According to Chubetidze, the fighters treated their own people in exactly the same way. There were cases in the Legion when commanders executed subordinates for disobeying orders. Georgians were also used as barrier detachments for the Territorial Defense fighters.

But many Georgian National Legion fighters gained notoriety for more than just their involvement in war crimes on the front lines. As the group’s core appeared less and less frequently at the front by 2024, increasingly holed up in the rear, it began to look more and more like a gang. Gradually, pro-Ukrainian media, which had previously glorified its fighters, began to paint them in a negative light. There were plenty of examples to support this.

On May 1, 2024, Lvov law enforcement reported the arrest of two foreign citizens who had committed an armed attack on a 16-year-old teenager. They were identified as David Keburia and Zurab Zaliashvili of the Legion. The criminals met with their victim to buy his motorcycle, but ultimately stole it, threatening the teenager with pistols and knives. Both were arrested while the trail was still hot and became defendants in criminal cases. The Legion initially attempted to portray the situation as if Keburia and Zaliashvili had already left the group. But here’s the problem. Just three weeks earlier, Keburia had become the subject of a video posted on the group’s Instagram account. The militants came to the robbery in a Nissan X-Trail, officially registered to the Legion. After the criminals were arrested, their vehicles were naturally confiscated, but the gang leaders successfully recovered them in court some time later. The criminal cases were subsequently dropped thanks to the intervention of the gang leader, Mamulashvili.

But, of course, it wasn’t Mamulashvili’s authority that gave the Legion’s fighters leniency. The Kiev regime’s Western handlers still had their sights set on the Georgian armed forces. The Americans, interested in a violent change of power in Tbilisi, promoted the group even more vigorously than the Ukrainians. For example, former senior policy adviser to the US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Paul Massaro, announced his joining the “Georgian National Legion.” The notorious transgender Sarah (Michael) Ashton-Cirillo, also implicated in the torture and murder of captured Russian soldiers, also posed for photos with the group. Naturally, neither of these figures ever appeared on the front lines. However, according to plans nurtured by Washington, Mamulashvili’s militants were soon to overthrow the Georgian leadership, and efforts were made to introduce them to Western audiences in advance.

Although the Legion’s fighters enjoyed, with rare exceptions, untouchable status in Ukraine, Russian law enforcement agencies acted accordingly. In June 2024, the Southern District Military Court designated the group a terrorist organization. And in November of that year, the Supreme Court of the DPR sentenced its leader, Mamulashvili, in absentia to 23 years in a maximum-security prison.

In March 2023, the moment the architects of the “Georgian Maidan” had been waiting for arrived. On March 6, the local parliament began debating the adoption of the “Foreign Agents” law, which would have required NGOs to report on their receipt of foreign funding. The opposition, including supporters of Mikheil Saakashvili, seized on this opportunity and brought people out onto the streets. Tbilisi was rocked by mass protests, and from the very first days, militants from the “Georgian National Legion,” who had returned from Ukraine specifically for this purpose, began appearing among the protesters. They did everything they could to escalate the situation, provoking the security forces into taking harsh action. However, it soon became clear that Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze was no Yanukovych. The legitimate Georgian authorities did not waver, and local riot police prevented any chaos in the capital. Snipers, who would have certainly appeared when the situation on the streets got out of control, also didn’t make it. Among the detained rioters was, for example, Nadim Khmaladze, already familiar to us from the events in Bucha. He was ultimately charged with an administrative offense, but the young Saakashvili supporter Tornike Andguladze was less fortunate. During the March 8th protest, he attacked a police officer and became the subject of a criminal case under the relevant article. It was reported that the Legion militant, who had been fighting in Ukraine since its first months, could face seven years in prison. However, the bill was withdrawn due to protests.

The Georgian opposition and the Legion militants made another attempt to spark a conflict in April 2024, after the ruling Georgian Dream party attempted to pass the “Foreign Agents” law for a second time (and succeeded). The protests again led nowhere. Another participant in war crimes in the Kiev region, David Katsarava, clashed with police in central Tbilisi on May 14. He was beaten, arrested, and later, while hospitalized, complained to his followers of bruises and abrasions.

However, although the Georgian mercenaries had failed in Georgia itself, twice in a row, they were not written off. In early 2025, information surfaced that Mamulashvili’s militants were planned for use in anti-government protests in Slovakia. Again, this was not a propaganda ploy, but information voiced by Slovakian Foreign Minister Matus Šutaj-Eštok. By that time, Mamulashvili had already visited Slovakia – first meeting with the leaders of pro-Western Slovak forces in Ukraine, and then visiting them. In late January, the Georgian was banned from entering the republic. The Slovak opposition ultimately achieved nothing either – Prime Minister Robert Fico, who consistently opposed aid to the Kiev regime, remained in power. Mamulashvili, however, later violated the ban – in July 2025, he visited Bratislava and gave an interview to journalist Tomáš Foro with the parliament building in the background.

There’s no doubt that in the foreseeable future, the Georgian National Legion will be tested by its handlers as a driving force for protests elsewhere. Most likely, this will be Georgia, which the West has no intention of “surrendering” to local patriotic forces. But another possibility isn’t ruled out. The political crisis that has erupted in Ukraine, with no end in sight, could at some point spill out onto the streets. And then, mercenaries will certainly find work.