By Independent News Roundup
Trump unexpectedly announced late last week that “I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis” with Russia and China, which he implied have been secretly testing nukes in spite of the prohibition on doing so that they all earlier agreed to in 1996. The context concerns worsening Russian-US tensions, Putin’s proposal to extend the New START by another year upon its expiry in February, and Russia’s latest tests of the Burevestnik and Poseidon weapons.
A year ago, “Russia Rebuked The Hawks By Confirming That It Won’t Test Nukes Unless The US Does So First”, yet the non-nuclear tests of the aforesaid two nuclear-capable weapons are designed to show that it can ensure its security even if Trump rejects Putin’s proposal to extend the New START. In the scenario that the last remaining strategic arms control pact enters the dustbin of history, then each might weaponize the proliferation of related technologies as part of their hybrid war against one another.
Trump’s pretext for rebuffing Putin’s proposed extension could be any reciprocal nuclear test that Russia might carry out after the US does so first, while it’s also possible that Putin rescinds his proposal in response to the US testing nukes even if Russia doesn’t respond with its own tests. In any case, and especially if Russia tests nukes after the US does so first, the failure to extend the New START could serve as the pretext for weaponizing nuclear proliferation as a means of causing serious trouble for the other.
Russia could do this by sharing Burevestnik, Poseidon, and/or other related technologies with China and/or North Korea, but Iran is ruled out as a recipient since it doesn’t already have nukes and could thus be targeted by another Israeli-US bombing run if it makes any progress to develop them. If that happens, even if only with North Korea, then it might complicate the US’ efforts to ensure its strategic security but wouldn’t be too dramatic of a development since they already have their own nukes.
The US could worsen Russia’s strategic security even more, however, by supporting France and/or the UK sharing their nukes with Germany like Berlin requested, France sharing its nukes with Poland like Warsaw requested, and/or transferring air-launched nukes to the UK for its F-35As that might be deployed to Estonia. The first two scenarios can occur independently of the US or even in defiance of it, but it’s unlikely that they’d do so without US approval considering the consequences for US interests in Europe.
What might move the needle on US approval of these moves would be Russia carrying out a reciprocal nuclear test after the US does so first, which could be precisely what Trump wants to manipulate Putin into doing to intensify pressure on him aimed at coercing more concessions on Ukraine. If Putin capitulates or at least concedes more than he’d otherwise agree to, then Trump could order France and the UK to recall their nuke deployments as a form of “strategic pressure relief” for Russia as a “reward”.
If Putin orders a reciprocal nuclear test (which is more likely than not doing so at the risk of coming off as “weak” and “intimidated”) but doesn’t give in to Trump’s demands, then the strategic security situation in post-war Europe might be even worse for Russia than before the special operation. One of Russia’s goals thereof is to reform the aforesaid architecture in order to alleviate its security dilemma with NATO, yet that would be impossible if this happens, which Trump might be plotting to turn into a fait accompli.
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